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ABSTRACT
Jiamin Qi, M.S., Department of Economics, Wright State University, 2004.
The Chinese Telecommunications Manufacturing Industry: An Economic Analysis.
The Chinese telecommunications manufacturing industry is one of the fastest 
growing industries in China. This paper addresses the question of how China can develop 
this industry and penetrate the U.S. market. To this end, I study the U.S. 
telecommunications manufacturing market to find market opportunities. Subsequently, I 
examine the Chinese telecommunications manufacturing industry, mainly focusing on the 
industry’s structures, and the vendors’ conduct and performance. Several government 
policies are discussed which will foster the development of this Chinese industry in the 





Chapter 1 Literature Review...........................................................................   .....3
1.1 Industry Analysis...................................     3
1.2 International Economics Analysis.................................................................. ......6
Chapter 2 Telecommunications Manufacturing Industry Analysis................................10
2.1 Overview of the Telecommunications Manufacturing Industry.......................10
2.2 The U.S. Telecommunications Manufacturing Market..................................... 14
2.3 The Chinese Telecommunications Manufacturing Industry.............................22
2.4 Chinese Vendors’ Efforts to Export.....................................................................29
Chapter 3 International Economic Analysis...................................................................37
3.1 China and the W TO.............................................................................................37
3.2 Trade between the United States and China......................................................41
3.3 Role of the Government..................................................................................... 43
3.4 Analysis of Tariff................................................................................................48
3.5 Analysis of Subsidies................................................   52
3.6 Analysis of Other Trade Policies.......................................................................55





Figure 1: Value Chain of Telecommunications Industry.........................................  11
Figure 2: U.S. Communication Equipment Market Outlook......................................... 16
Figure 3: U.S. Communication Equipment Market Share in 2002...........................   17
Figure 4: Leading Vendors Operating Revenues in U.S.................................................21
Figure 5: The Development of Telecom Services in China...........................................24
Figure 6: China Telecom Equipment Market Share in 2002  .............. 26
Figure 7: ZTE’s Product Portfolio  ............................................................................. 34
Figure 8: History of China Foreign Trade....................................................................... 38
Figure 9: Product Life Cycle............................................................................................46




Table 1: Sizes of the Giant Vendors....................................................................................  17
Table 2: Telecommunication Indicators: China vs. Selected Countries in 2002..........   24
Table 3: Summary of Vendors’ Profiles.................................................   28
Table 4: Exhibitions List of ZTE..........................................................................................35
Table 5: U.S. and China WTO Agreement..........................................................................   51
Table 6: Behaviors Possibilities I ...................................................   52
Table 7: Behaviors Possibilities I I ........................................................................................ 53
Introduction
China has increased dramatically its share of world trade since the end of the 
1970s due to its market opening reforms. Chinese customs’ statistics show that the 
amount of foreign trade (including import and export) has risen from US$ 44 billion in 
1981 to US$ 851 billion in 2003.1 Due to comparative advantages generated by lower 
labor costs, Chinese firms are growing rapidly and participating actively in international 
trade. Commodities marked “Made in China” are found in every comer of the earth, and 
most of them are primarily labor-intensive goods with an increasing number of high- 
technology exports.
The Chinese government does not view labor-intensive industries as strategic 
growth engines for the national economy. Instead of pursuing growth for growth’s sake, 
the new Chinese government, led by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, is 
devoted to improving working conditions and wages for peasant workers, “the major 
force of the Chinese working class”.2 In the meantime, Premier Wen Jiabao has 
announced that agricultural taxes would be phased out in the next five years. As peasant 
workers return to the country-side, a labor shortage has developed in China.4 Therefore, 
China may be losing to other developing countries its low cost advantage in labor- 
intensive commodities.
1 Chinese customs’ statistics, (http://www.customs.gov.cn/tongjishujv/a/Page 1 .htm)
2 Peasant worker has become major force of China's working class, China Daily, July 09, 2004. 
(http://english.people.com.cn/200407/09/eng20040709_149051.html)
3 Agricultural Tax to Be Phased Out, China Daily September 11, 2004. 
(http://www.china.org.cn/english/BAT/106768.htm)
4 Rowan Callick, China's Labor Shortage, Tech Center Station, August 31, 2004.
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In the long term, the future of high-technology industries backed by skilled 
engineers is more promising. China is changing its export inventory from labor-intensive 
exports to technology-intensive exports. The telecommunication manufacturing industry 
is a driving force for the giant Chinese economy and is becoming a pillar for its national 
economy according to the Chinese government “863” high-technology research and 
development plan.5 Chinese telecommunications equipment vendors have joined the 
international telecommunications equipment market, especially the U.S. market. Huawei, 
the flagship of the Chinese telecommunications manufacturing industry, has set up 32 
branches worldwide to support its global operations, and its contracted sales reached 
US$3.83 billion in 2003.6 Currently, the Chinese vendors have their eyes on the U.S. 
telecommunications equipment market which is one of the most advanced markets in the 
world.
First, what role can the telecommunications manufacturing industry play in the 
Chinese economy? Second, what strategies can China pursue to develop its 
telecommunications manufacturing industry and penetrate the U.S. market? Third, how 
can the Chinese vendors gain access to the U.S. market? Fourth, what policies shall the 
Chinese government make to advance the industry’s international participation? In 
seeking answers to these questions, chapter one reviews previous telecommunications 
industry studies and international trade theories. Chapter 2 examines the U.S. 
telecommunications manufacturing market and the Chinese telecommunications 
manufacturing industry. Chapter 3 traces the impact of Chinese government regulations 
on this industry. The conclusions are made in the last chapter.
5 863 high technology research and development plan is launched to develop the Chinese economy through 
high technology, (http://www.chinatech.com.en/techachieve/intro/plan863.htm#aaa)
6 Company Profile, (http:// www. huawei .com)
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Chapter 1 Literature Review
This chapter reviews previous industry studies and international trade theories, 
and establishes the groundwork for my economic examination of the industry. The first 
section focuses on several industry analyses from the industry’s and the firm’s 
perspectives. The second section introduces a policy evaluation criterion and explains 
two international economic trade models: the product life cycle model and the 
international Cournot duopoly model.
1.1 Industry Analysis
The two primary industry studies which suggest ways to analyze the U.S. and 
Chinese telecommunications manufacturing industry, are Susan McMaster’s 
“Telecommunications: competition and network access” 7 and Qingxuan Meng and
O
Mingzhi Li’s “New economy and ICT development in China” . McMaster analyzes 
competition in the U.S. telecommunications industry and finds that the industry structure 
has changed dramatically since 1984. The U.S. telecommunications industry, which 
includes both service and manufacturing, has become more competitive than before. 
McMaster notes the role that federal regulations and state regulations, principally the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, have played in fostering increased competition in the
7 Susan McMaster, Telecommunications: competition and network access, Industry Studies, 3rd ed, 2002, 
r,351.
Qingxuan Meng and Mingzhi Li, New economy and ICT development in China, Information Economics 
and Policy Volume: 14, Issue: 2, June, 2002.
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U.S. telecommunications industry. Further, she examines the industry changes provided 
by new technology and by mergers which have altered the U.S. telecommunications 
industry. McMaster states: “The changes seen throughout the industry since 1984 have 
been rapid and dramatic, with a multitude of new services and technologies being used to 
provide telecommunications to consumers... and competition is now a reality.”9 
McMaster concludes that the transition from a monopoly to multiple competitors was due 
to new regulations, judicial oversight, and technological innovation.
Qingxuan Meng and Mingzhi Li analyze the link between the new economy and 
the information and communication technology industry (ICT) development in China. By 
collecting data on China’s ICT industry development and diffusion, Meng and Li explore 
the status of the ICT industry in the Chinese economy. They also examine the impact of 
the ICT industry on the economic inequalities among three different regions of China: the 
eastern, the central and the western zones. The more ICT investment in a region, the 
higher the GDP per capita in that region. Meng and Li conclude that: “Developing 
countries can use the information and communication technology to their advantage to 
restructure their industry structures.”10 High-technology industry can provide a “unique 
shortcut for the developing countries to leam from the industrialized world and to build a 
completely new market mechanism.”11 This is a cornerstone of the Chinese government 
“863” high-technology research and development plan.
From the firms’ perspective, Industry Surveys12 details methods of analyzing 
internal firm and external market factors of the telecommunications manufacturing




12 Eileen M. Bossong-Martines, Industry Surveys, 2004, Standard & Poor’s, Communications Equipment
p22.
industry. It emphasizes that both the financial and non-financial factors of firms must be 
considered in today’s competitive environment. According to Industry Surveys, the firm’s 
financial factors analysis can be divided into income statement analysis and balance sheet 
analysis. The firm’s non-financial factors analysis includes government regulations, the 
rapid development of technology, and management factors. I adopt this non-financial 
factors method to analyze the Chinese vendors. By examining the internal factors of the 
vendors, I identify their core competencies and weaknesses. Meanwhile, the analysis of 
external market factors helps to find market opportunities and threats for vendors. By 
examining external market factors, I make an assessment of the Chinese vendors’ 
international expansion and the development of the telecommunications manufacturing 
industry.
My research is carried out by implementing selected methods of the above three 
authors. Similar to McMaster, I examine the competition in the U.S. telecommunications 
manufacturing market and the Chinese telecommunications manufacturing industry. The 
industry’s structures, the U.S. and Chinese telecommunications equipment vendors’ 
strategies, and their respective performance are studied. The role of the Chinese 
telecommunications manufacturing industry in the national economy is consistent with 
Meng and Li’s high-technology argument. By analyzing the economic and market factors 
facing Chinese companies, I present the opportunities available in the U.S. market, which 
provides policy implications for the Chinese government in developing its 
telecommunications manufacturing industry.
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1.2 International Economics Analysis
The proper form of government intervention remains very much an open question.
Today, most people believe that free trade can improve the general welfare of all
societies. Adam Smith, the founding father of economics, advocated free trade and
presents the principle of absolute advantage. According to Smith, a country shall export
goods with absolute advantage and import goods with absolute disadvantage. Absolute
disadvantage means a country can produce a product with less input than other countries.
Robert Carbaugh interprets absolute advantage as follows:
“In a two nation, two product world, international trade and specialization will be 
beneficial when one nation has an absolute cost advantage (that is, less labor to 
produce a unit of output) in one good and the other nation has an absolute cost 
advantage in the other good.”13
On the basis of absolute advantage theory, David Ricardo further developed a 
more important international trade theory—comparative advantage theory. Ricardo 
refined the absolute advantage theory, and he stated that both nations can achieve mutual 
benefits from free trade even when a nation is more efficient in production of all 
commodities than its trading partner. Through free trade, countries can arrange their 
resources more efficiently and improve their productivity.
Nevertheless, free trade is not realistic in the world despite the strong theoretical 
arguments mentioned above. Instead, almost every country has some protective 
regulations on international trade. The common regulations include tariffs, subsidies, 
quotas, and other non-tariff trade barriers. A tariff is levied on imported commodities to 
protect domestic manufacturing industries, especially infant industries. Subsidies are 
granted by the government to domestic producers so that they can compete with foreign
13 Robert Carbaugh, International Economics, 2001, p28.
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rivals. Other non-tariff trade barriers include countervailing duties, antidumping 
regulations, local content requirements, government procurement policies, bilaterally 
negotiated restraints, administrative policies and voluntary export restraints. Under 
perfect competition, policies which cut tariffs and subsidies can improve general welfare. 
However, a government designs tariffs, subsidies and the other trade barriers to protect 
the domestic firms under imperfect competition. For an important industry such as the 
telecommunications manufacturing industry, the Chinese government is prudent to 
nurture its international expansion. The Chinese government has implemented numerous 
tariffs, subsidies, local content requirements and government procurement policies in the 
telecommunications manufacturing industry. A primary question for the government and 
economists is how to assess the efficiency of these protective government interventions 
and perhaps find more appropriate intervening policies. One key criterion in answering 
this question is to evaluate whether the policy is the most effective and justified way to 
achieve the national objectives. Chapter three applies this criterion to discuss policies of 
the Chinese government.
Furthermore, there are two models applied to analyze government regulations in 
chapter three, Vernon’s product life cycle model and Brander and Spencer’s international 
Cournot duopoly model. In his famous paper “International Investment and International 
Trade in the Product Cycle”, Raymond Vernon14 develops a dynamic product life cycle 
model which explores the innovation timing for industrial manufacturing goods. Vernon 
assumes that manufacturers in developed countries are similar to each other in terms of 
scientific knowledge, and he hypothesizes that a U.S. manufacturer is the innovator of a
14 Raymond Vernon, International investment and international trade in the product cycle, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics; May 1966, Vol. 80.
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high-income or labor-saving product in his model. The U.S. producer dominates the 
domestic and export markets as the innovator in the early stage. In the next stage, since 
less developed countries are more attractive as production locations of standardized 
products, then the production location shifts from the U.S. to a developing country due to 
its lower labor costs. The producer in a developing country begins to imitate the U.S. 
producer. Finally, the U.S. producer loses its market share and becomes an importer of 
this product: “[T]he local markets henceforth will be filled from local production units set 
up abroad...the obvious production-cost differences between the rival producing areas 
are usually differences due to scale and differences due to labor costs.”15
Vernon’s product life cycle model can be summarized with four stages. Stage 1 is 
an introductory stage when a home country has an export monopoly to a foreign country 
in terms of a new product. Stage 2 is an imitation stage where the foreign country begins 
to produce the product. In Stage 3, the foreign country increases its production and 
becomes competitive in the export market. In Stage 4, the home country production 
declines, and the foreign country exports to the home country. This dynamic product life 
cycle model is applied to analyze the trend of future development of the Chinese 
telecommunications manufacturing industry in chapter three. In this model, the U.S. 
vendors are supposed to be the innovators, and the Chinese vendors are supposed to be 
the imitators.
Brander and Spencer, in their revolutionary paper, “International R&D Rivalry 
and Industrial Strategy”, examine the government’s role in vital industries and present 
their international Cournot duopoly model of approaching strategic policies. Brander and
15 Raymond Vernon, International investment and international trade in the product cycle, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics; May 1966, Vol. 80, pl98.
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Spencer build this model to examine behaviors of two competing firms: “In the first stage
firms choose R&D levels, and in the second stage, output levels.”16 Their approach
assumes that the government can commit itself to strategic policies and influence the set
of credible actions of players. Brander and Spencer say that:
“If the government can use both export subsidies and R & D  subsidies (or taxes), 
a fairly striking result is obtained: . . . to use an export subsidy to enable the 
domestic firm to capture a larger share of the industry than it would unaided.”17
Brander and Spencer’s international Cournot duopoly model is practical to 
develop strategic policies and to analyze the impact that the Chinese government has on 
the development of the telecommunications manufacturing industry. In this model, the 
U.S. vendors and the Chinese vendors are classified as two competing groups. The 
behaviors of these two groups are examined in two stages of R&D levels and output 
levels, and relative conclusions are made in chapter three.
16 Brander and Spencer, International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy, Reviews of Economic Studies, 
1983, p708.
17 Ibid, p717.
The first section of this chapter is an overview of the telecommunications 
manufacturing industry. The second section examines the U.S. telecommunications 
manufacturing market and the Chinese telecommunications manufacturing industry 
respectively. Finally, the last section discusses strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities 
of the Chinese vendors in the international marketplace.
2.1 Overview of the Telecommunications Manufacturing Industry
Our planet has an electronic network linked by a telecommunications 
infrastructure. Individuals can use their home phones or cell phones to call friends around 
the world. The telecommunications equipment vendors sell wired and wireless networks 
to telecommunications carriers and enterprises. By offering diversified equipment, the 
telecommunications equipment vendors play an important role in connecting the world. 
The position of the telecommunications equipment vendors in the value chain is 
illustrated in figure 1.
Chapter 2 Telecommunications Manufacturing Industry Analysis
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Figure It  Value Chain of Telecommunications Industry18








The telecommunications equipment vendors are located in the downstream 
portion of the industry. They purchase original equipment and components from the 
upstream manufacturers in the industry, and supply synthesized telecommunications 
networks to telecommunications service providers. By delivering more sophisticated 
solutions and services to customers instead of supplying merely manufacturing 
equipment, telecommunications equipment vendors maximize their profits in this value 
chain.
Telecommunications equipment consists of telecom equipment and networking 
equipment. According to Industry Surveys,19 telecommunications products are classified 
as telecom equipment, which is sold to telecommunications carriers, and networking 
equipment, which is sold to enterprises. Networking equipment is comprised of
18 Trends in Communications-An Environment Overview.
(http://www.ewh.ieee.org/r7/southern_alberta/html/events/trends_in_communications.pps)
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switch/servers, routers, network interface cards and hubs, which provides enterprise a 
range of connectivity solutions. Telecom equipment has two segments: wired equipment 
and wireless equipment. Wired equipment includes switch/access networks, broadband, 
data communication and optical transmission. Wireless telecommunications equipment 
includes two types of networks, based on either GSM (Global System for Mobile 
Communications, the most popular wireless technology standard in the world) or CDMA 
(Code Division Multiple Access) technologies. Qualcomm, a U.S. company, invented the 
core CDMA standard, and collects license fees from carriers and vendors in the world. 
The 3G (third generation) network, which provides voice and data transmissions with 
larger capacities and higher speeds than the current GSM and CDMA network, is 
expected to generate great profit in the market. There are two widely used 3G standards: 
WCDMA (wideband code division multiple access) and CDMA 2000. In addition, there 
is a TD-SCDMA standard which “has become one of the three dominant standards of 
third generation mobile (3G) telecommunications systems, along with WCDMA 
(wideband CDMA) in Europe and Japan and CDMA in the United States.”20
The telecommunications products and technologies mentioned above provide 
business opportunities for the telecommunications equipment vendors. These diversified 
telecommunications products and technologies are evolving very quickly, and the life 
cycle of telecommunications equipment is becoming shorter and shorter. The vendors sell 
telecommunications equipment to public services carriers and big enterprises such as 
IBM. The number of such customers is limited because not every company needs to buy 
telecommunications equipment, and these giant customers usually make big purchases of
20 China's TD-SCDMA to be Operational by Mid-2005, ITU Strategy and Policy Unit Newslog. 
(http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/newslog/2004/02/25.html).
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telecommunications equipment. Sometimes it takes years for a telecommunications 
equipment vendor to make a deal with a telecommunications carrier due to the 
complexity of telecommunications equipment. By the time a vendor produces and 
launches a new telecommunications product after years of research, the market for this 
product might have already waned.
In view of this challenge, every competitor in the telecommunications equipment 
market has to race to stay abreast of the newest technologies. They differentiate their 
products by enhancing product features, and claim that they can provide the best network 
solutions to satisfy customers’ requirements. In the meantime, a precise estimation of 
technology development trends has great impact on the performance of the vendors. A 
telecommunications equipment vendor can strike it rich if the vendor invests in the 
practicable technology. Otherwise, the vendor may suffer financial losses if it bets wrong, 
as with the Motorola’s iridium satellite constellation plan. Motorola failed to meet its 
profit expectation as it bet heavily on this 77 satellite communication system. The system 
deployed the most advanced technology contemporarily, but it was not suitable for 
commercial uses.21
The telecommunications manufacturing industry, being a capital-intensive and 
technology-intensive industry, faces high entry barriers. The minimum economy of scale 
(MES) for this industry is larger than many industries, which suggests higher opportunity 
costs for potential new entrants. Small companies are incapable of gaining MES. 
Consequently, the telecommunications manufacturing industry is an oligopolistic 
industry. R&D ability is essential in helping the telecommunication equipment vendors to 
be competitive in the market by providing total solutions and services. This
21 Iridium, Wikipedia, (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iridium_(satellite)).
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technological-oriented industry provides opportunities for the high-technology firms in 
less developed countries to participate in the telecommunications equipment market.
2.2 The U.S. Telecommunications Manufacturing Market
The U.S. telecommunications manufacturing market enjoyed positive growth 
until 2001. The Encyclopedia o f American Industries states that “the telecommunications 
equipment manufacturing industry at the end of the 1990s was very strong.. .The 
Telecommunication Industry Association reported that U.S. spending in 1998 totaled 
$121 billion.”22 In 2001, the spending declined significantly, and the demand for 
telecommunications equipment from enterprises dropped 28%.23 The aggregate losses 
continued because the U.S. telecommunications manufacturing market suffered from 
poor economic conditions in 2002 and from telecommunications infrastructure 
overinvestment in the late 1990s. This telecommunications infrastructure overinvestment 
created an excess capacity in telecommunications and led to the decreased spending in 
2001 and 2002.
According to DATAMONITOR: “Many American businesses chose to step back 
from the cutting edge of communication equipment, no longer concentrating upon having 
the latest equipment, instead preferring to continue using their current equipment and 
reduce overheads.”24 Since 2001, the giant telecommunications equipment vendors, 
particularly Lucent, had financial trouble. From 2001 to 2003, Lucent announced 
multiple layoffs to cut costs for surviving in the harsh economic environment.
22 Rebecca Marlow-Ferguson, Encyclopedia of American Industries, 2001, Gale Group, pl057.
23 Eileen M. Bossong-Martines, Industry Surveys, 2004, Standard & Poor’s, Communications Equipment
P.L
Communications Equipment in the United States, Communications Equipment Industry Profile: United
States. 2003, DATAMONITOR p8.
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Despite the decline of the U.S. telecommunication manufacturing market in 2001 
and 2002, the U.S. telecommunications manufacturing market is expected to recover in 
the next few years because of new demand for network equipment. Technology 
development and the government’s efforts are the most important driving forces for the 
U.S. telecommunications manufacturing market. According to Icon Group,25 the potential 
world telecommunications equipment market is expected to expand to US$574,044 
million by 2005, and the U.S. telecommunications equipment market potential shall reach 
US$162,330 million by 2005, which accounts for 28% of the global market. Figure 2 
demonstrates the growth of the U.S. telecommunications equipment market as a 
percentage of global markets from 1995 to 2005.
23 The 2000-2005 world outlook for telecommunications equipment, San Diego, Calif. : Icon Group Ltd.
c2002. (http://www.netlibrary.com/EbookDetails.aspx).
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Figure 2: U.S. Communication Equipment Market Outlook26
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The U.S. telecommunications equipment market is dominated by several giant 
telecommunications equipment vendors. The four major companies, Motorola, who has 
the largest share in the U.S. telecommunications equipment market, Cisco, Lucent and 
Nokia, account for 45.9% of the 2002 U.S. market. The other big competitors in this 
market include Alcatel, Nortel, and Ericsson.
26 The 2000-2005 world outlook for telecommunications equipment, San Diego, Calif. : Icon Group Ltd.,
c2002. (http://www.netlibrary.com/EbookDetails.aspx).
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Figure 3: U.S. Communication Equipment Market Share in 200227
U.S.Communication Equipment Market Share in 2002
(source: datamonitor)




All the current telecommunications equipment vendors have close relationships 
with the major carriers, and they are expanding in the industry and gaining revenues. 
Table 1 lists the sizes (in employment) and revenues for the current main vendors in the 
U.S. market. These seven transnational telecommunications equipment vendors currently 
dominate the U.S. market.
Table 1: Sizes of the Giant Vendors (source: company profiles)
Firms Employees in 2003 (world)
Revenues in 2003 $billion 
(world)
Lucent 32000 8.5
■J aa 34000 ..: ;







! 1 52000 16.3
Motorola 88000 27
1L a 51000 i '■
Nortel 37000 9.8
27 Communications Equipment in the United States, Communications Equipment Industry Profile: United 
States, 2003, DATAMONITOR., pl2.
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Lucent has a proud and long R&D history from its Bell laboratories parentage 
though it is a new independent company.28 Compared to the long R&D history of Lucent, 
Cisco is much younger. It has grown very fast and has become one of the largest 
networking equipment providers in the world.29 In terms of networking equipment, Cisco 
accounts for almost 40% of the 2002 U.S. market share.30 Nortel Networks, 
headquartered in Ontario, Canada, is another famous vendor in the North American 
telecommunications manufacturing industry. Alcatel, established in 1898, is the largest 
telecommunications equipment vendor in France.31 Motorola, originally founded in 1928, 
is the leader of wireless and broadband telecommunications worldwide.32 Nokia is a 
Finnish mobile telecommunications company which primarily provides GSM and CDMA 
standard voice-centric wireless phones and mobile networks to operators and businesses. 
In 2003, Nokia’s pro forma operating profit achieved EUR 5.1 billion.33 Ericsson, a 
Norwegian company, claims itself as the largest total solution supplier of mobile 3G 
terminals, networks and services in the world because 40% of mobile calls in this planet 
were made through Ericsson’s wireless systems in 2003.34
The telecommunications equipment of these companies is homogenous 
functionally. The costs to develop and manufacture telecommunications products create 
high entry barriers and a small number of large firms. Vendors try their best to capture 
more market share so that they can increase profit. Normally, vendors gain market shares 
by pursuing the economies of scale, economies of scope, good relationships with
28 Company profile (http://www.lucent.com/corpinfo/history.html).
29 Corporation overview (http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/corpfact.html).
30 Robert Lazich, Market Share Reporter, 2004, Gale Group, p246.
31 Company profile (http://www.alcatel.com/apropos/history/index.htm).
32 Company profile (http://www.motorola.com/content/O,,l,00.html)
33 Company profile (http://www.nokia.eom/nokia/0,8764,624,00.html)
34 Company profile (http://www.ericsson.com/about/)
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customers, and updated technologies. Another reason why the current dominant vendors 
have large market shares is because of switching costs for carriers. In order to obtain 
consistency and stability of the network, usually the carrier chooses the equipment from 
the same vendor, who had provided the equipment for the existing network, to upgrade 
and expand its network. Otherwise, the carrier has to bear the extra costs for new vendor 
evaluation, equipment testing, and maintenance training. The incumbents made great 
profits from their large market shares in the market, and they have high revenues every 
year. For example, Cisco’s revenue in fiscal year 2003 was US$18.9 billion, and its profit 
was US$3.6 billion.35 Although these telecommunications equipment vendors are 
competing against each other, this industry is less competitive than a perfect competitive 
industry. What makes this industry an oligopoly is the fact that the firm’s decisions are 
interdependent, impacting one another.
In 2002, the U.S. telecommunications equipment market was comprised of two 
parts: telecom equipment (54%) and networking equipment (46%).36 Industry Surveys 
notes that the U.S. telecommunications infrastructure is “evolving into a series of linked 
electronic networks capable of performing a variety of functions...As wireless and wired 
networking standards evolve, consumers and businesses will be able to connect every
on
electronic application in their homes or workplace.” This trend offers market 
opportunities to the telecommunications equipment vendors. Industry Surveys points out 
that:
“data from the US Department of commerce for October 2003 (latest available)
35 Company profile (http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/corpfact.html).
36 Communications Equipment in the United States, Communications Equipment Industry Profile: United 
States. 2003, DATAMONITOR plO.
37 Eileen M. Bossong-Martines, Industry Surveys, 2004, Standard & Poor’s, Communications Equipment 
pi.
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show strong momentum in new orders for communications equipment, a leading 
indicator of equipment demand.. .For 2004, Standard & Poor’s sees a mid-to 
upper single digit recovery in enterprise networking gear sales.”38 
Sharon Grace estimates that enterprises’ spending on networking equipment
including voice and data communication equipment will increase to US$122 billion in
2007. She comments that: “The small to medium-sized business market, for example,
will become a more important source of spending as companies upgrade their
technological infrastructure to be competitive.”39 As a comparison with networking
equipment, Grace estimates that carriers’ spending on telecom equipment will decline to
US$19 billion in 2007. Note that customers of networking equipment differ from
customers of telecom equipment. The number of enterprise customers is more than the
number of carriers, and the enterprises market is more competitive than the
telecommunications carriers market. The enterprises’ demands are more elastic than the
telecommunications carriers’ demands and the escalating demand for network equipment
impacts on the vendors greatly. Figure 4 lists the operating revenues of the
telecommunications equipment vendors in the U.S. market.
38 Eileen M. Bossong-Martines, Industry Surveys, 2004, Standard & Poor’s, Communications Equipment,
ft2’Sharon Grace, Spending on Enterprise Voice and Data Equipment Expected to Increase to $122 Billion in 
2007, IA Online, April 7, 2004.
(http://www.tiaonline.org/media/press_releases/index.cfm?parelease=04-39)
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Figure 4: Leading Vendors Operating Revenues in U.S.40

















The above figure illustrates that the revenues of the telecom equipment vendors, 
such as Alcatel, Nortel, and Lucent, are declining substantially, while the revenues of the 
networking equipment vendor Cisco is increasing. Paul Travis reports that: “Wall Street 
expects the world's largest maker of networking equipment [Cisco] to report profit gains 
based on sales of home networking products and phones for sending calls over IP 
networks.”41 Therefore, new entrants who manufacture the cost-effective networking 
equipment, have an opportunity to enter the U.S. market by focusing on enterprise 
customers.
Another U.S. market opportunity for a foreign vendor is optical switches, a 
rapidly expanding market. Industry Surveys estimates that this optical switches “market
40 Eileen M. Bossong-Martines, Industry Surveys, 2004, Standard & Poor’s, Communications Equipment 
p32.
41 Paul Travis, Cisco Profits Up 29%, Information Week, Nov. 9, 2004. 
(http://informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=52600310).
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will expand 13% in 2004 to $286 million.”42 The third U.S. market opportunity lies in the 
wireless market. In the U.S. market, analysts expect the 3G wireless networks, which 
provide fast data transmission speeds, to create huge market potential for both wireless 
networks vendors and terminal (handsets) vendors.
Parts of the U.S. market with strong demand growth are where entry opportunities 
exist. The growing demands for networking equipment, optical switches, and 3G wireless 
networks supply enter opportunities to potential entrants who have cost-effective 
products and strong R&D capabilities. The U.S. telecommunications manufacturing 
market is a potential gold mine for international telecommunications equipment vendors.
2.3 The Chinese Telecommunications Manufacturing Industry
As a developing country, China, which wants to advance its economic progress
and build a domestic telecommunications defense system, has been fostering the
development of its telecommunications manufacturing industry. The Chinese
telecommunications industry is experiencing significant development because of
economic opening and reform. Previously, a monopoly existed in the Chinese
telecommunications industry. Liang Xiongjian and Zhang Jing write:
“From 1949 to 1977 telecommunications developed very slowly in China because 
its role in the national economy was not recognized correctly. By the end of 1977, 
the telephone density was only 0.36 percent [of total population], having 
increased less than 0.02 percent per year.”43
Before the economic reforms, the Chinese telecommunications industry lagged 
behind many comparable developing countries, let alone developed countries. The
42 Eileen M. Bossong-Martines, Industry Surveys, 2004, Standard & Poor’s, Communications Equipment
p8.
43 Liang Xiongjian and Zhang Jing, Development and Regulatory System Reform of the 
Telecommunications Industry in China, Global Communications Newsletter. 
(http://www.comsoc.org/pubs/gcn/gcnll03.html).
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Chinese government then made policies to stimulate the telecommunications 
manufacturing industry growth. Due to these preferential policies, the 
telecommunications manufacturing industry became a strategic supportive industry for 
the Chinese economy. Icon Group estimates that this industry’s expected sales will reach 
US$23,056 million in 2005.44
Since the Chinese telecommunications manufacturing industry is connected 
closely to the Chinese telecommunications services industry, the telecommunications 
services industry is examined firstly. Figure 5 illustrates the substantial growth of the 
main telecommunications services subscribers, which include fixed line subscribers, 
mobile subscribers and internet subscribers.
44 The 2000-2005 world outlook for telecommunications equipment, San Diego, Calif. : Icon Group Ltd.
c2Q02. (http://www.netlibrary.com/EbookDetails.aspx).
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Figure 5: The Development of Telecom Services in China45
Although the mobile subscribers and the fixed line subscribers are increasing 
rapidly, the wired and wireless Chinese subscriber densities (the number of telephone 
subscribers per 100 persons in a country) are still very low compared to developed 
countries. Table 2 lists the differences of telecommunications indicators between China 
and several other countries 46
Table 2: Telecommunication Indicators: China vs. Selected Countries in 2002
Nation Population Tele-density Cellular density
China 1.3 billion 17% 16%
India 1.0 billion 4% 1%
Japan 127 million 56% 64%
United States 280 million 65% 48%
45 China Economics Network, Telecom Services Development Data.
(http://down.cenet.org.cn/list.asp?id=5).
46 Eileen M. Bossong-Martines, Industry Surveys, 2004, Standard & Poor’s, Communications Equipment 
p3.
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In 2002, China’s telephone density was about one fourth of the United States and 
only 17 of 100 people in China had a telephone line. Fortunately, the booming Chinese 
economy is fueling the rapid growth of the domestic Chinese telecommunications 
industry: both the fixed line subscriber density and the wireless subscriber density are 
now approximately 24% 47
The Chinese government always retains part ownership of the carriers, and is 
prudent in issuing new telecommunications licenses. The government believes that the 
information technology and the telecommunications industries propel both the national 
modernization and the Chinese economy. Therefore, the government assigns high priority 
to and creates favorable policies for this industry. Currently, the Chinese Ministry of 
Information Industry licenses six state-owned carriers that are engaged in the wired and 
wireless telecommunications services. These giant carriers are growing rapidly and 
constructing their own infrastructure networks. As the telecommunications industry 
expands, so does its thirst for telecommunications equipment. The telecommunications 
manufacturing industry is fueled by the strong demand of the telecommunications 
services industry. Compared to the telecommunications services industry, the domestic 
telecommunications manufacturing industry is more open and competitive.
At the beginning of the economic reform, the Chinese telecommunications 
manufacturing industry lagged behind the world because China had only one skeleton 
telecommunications network at that time. Until the late 1990s, the Chinese 
telecommunications equipment markets were dominated by transnational companies: 
Motorola, Alcatel, Ericsson, Nokia and Siemens, who established joint ventures or 
subsidiaries in China. The domestic telecommunications equipment manufacturers are
47 Statistics of Ministry of Information Industry, June 2004.
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growing very fast and achieving remarkable accomplishments. Several prominent 
vendors took the market back from foreign giant vendors using government legislated 
priority status and low interest loans. Also, these Chinese manufacturers improved 
product quality and reduced costs. Figure 6 displays the main competitors’ shares in the 
China telecommunications equipment market in 2002.
Figure 6: China Telecom Equipment Market Share in 200248
China Telecom Equipment Market Share in 2002
(source: datamonitor)
Nokia, 12.0% Huawei, 12.3%
Established in 1988 as a small company with only RMB20,000 (US$2400) 
registered capital, Huawei is the flagship Chinese telecommunications equipment vendor 
with 12.3% market share. Forty-six percent of Huawei’s 22,000 employees are engaged 
in R&D. Its products and services range from traditional switching equipment to state-of- 
the-art networks (e.g. 3G and DWDM). In 2003, Huawei ramped up overseas sales to 
RMB31.7 billion (US$3.83 billion) and grasped increased market shares throughout the 
world. For example, the sales of Huawei’s U-SYS NGN (next generation network) 
ranked second in the world NGN market according to Dittbemer (a renowned
48 Communications Equipment in China, Communications Equipment Industry Profile: China 2003, 
DATAMONITOR, pl2.
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telecommunication consultant), and Huawei won over 40% of China's high-end market 
share according to the CCUD (China Center of Information Industry Development).49 
Huawei is a privately-owned company at present, and it has the ambition to be listed on 
either the Hong Kong or the U.S. stock market soon.
ZTE, established in 1985, is the largest telecommunications equipment provider 
listed in Shenzhen stock market. As Huawei’s main competitor in China, ZTE is 
expanding rapidly and annually has 17,000 employees and RMB 16.03 billion (US$ 1.9 
billion) revenue.50 ZTE pursues growth strategies which emphasize stability. It obtains its 
core competitiveness by CDMA technology investment, and currently is the largest 
CDMA equipment supplier in China. In June 2004, the ITU (International 
Telecommunication Union, a specialized agency of the United Nations) chose ZTE to 
draft two important international standards which will shape the future of the world's next 
generation networks.51
The other major vendors in the Chinese telecommunications manufacturing 
industry include less-famous domestic companies and joint ventures. Datang Telecom 
Technology, established in 1998, is famous for inventing the TD-SCDMA technology 
which is an alternative core 3G technology of WCDMA and CDMA2000. Datang’s 2003 
revenue is RMB 1.8 billion (US$212 million).52 Expecting Datang to be another 
Qualcomm, the Chinese government strongly supports Datang’s cooperation with 
Siemens on the TD-SCDMA R&D. The China Putian Institute of Technology, established 
in 1980, has a close relationship with the Ministry of Information Industry. In 2001 and
49 Huawei Global Sales Reached US$3.83 Billion in 2003. 
(http://www.huawei.com/about/News-Events/News-Center/930.shtml).
50 Company profile: (http://www.zte.com.cn/English/01about/index.jsp).
51 ITU selects ZTE to draft next-gen standards, China Information Industry, June 28, 2004.
52 Company profile: (http://www.chinanex.com/company/datang.htm).
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2002, Putian was the largest company listed in the government publication entitled “Top 
100 Chinese Electronic & Information Enterprises”. Its revenue in 2003 was RMB36 
billion (US$4.3 billion). Though it has a wide range of products and core networks, 
Putian’s revenue mainly derives from wireless terminal sales.53 Table 3 briefly 
summarizes the profiles of the major Chinese vendors.
Table 3: Summary of Vendors’ Profiles
Company 2003 annual sales Owned Location
Huawei US$3.83 billion Privately owned Shenzhen
ZTE US$ 1.9 billion State-owned Shenzhen
Datang US$212 million State-owned Xian
Putian US$4.3 billion State-owned Beijing
By examining the histories of these Chinese vendors, I can identify several 
strategies which they are using to compete against foreign companies. The first one is to 
focus on R&D. For example, ZTE spent a large amount of money on R&D and 
diversified its products ranging from wired and wireless telecommunication to data and 
optical networks. The second method is the two-part tariff technique which helped 
vendors to increase their market shares. A two-part tariff is “a pricing technique in which 
the price of a product or service is composed of two parts.”54 The Chinese vendors 
entered the market by first selling the basic equipment or network at a rock-bottom price, 
and then they charged the customer a profitable price for every additional piece of 
equipment or network. Meanwhile, they created high entry barriers by offering such low 
price networks to the carriers. The third method is rent-seeking. The Chinese vendors
53 Corporate summary, (http://www.chinanex.com/company/ptic.htm).
54 Definition of two-part tariff. (http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Two_part_tariff).
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persuaded related government departments to make favorable policies for them. On the 
one hand, rent-seeking created entry barriers for potential new entrants. On the other 
hand, new entrants can use rent-seeking strategy to ease entry barriers as well. With these 
methods, the major Chinese vendors perform well in earning profit. For example, 
Huawei’s 2003 net profit of US$460 million ranks number one in the Chinese electronic 
and information industry, and ZTE’s 2003 profit, US$147 million, ranks sixth.55
Having dramatically increased their R&D capabilities and competitiveness in the 
past decade, the Chinese companies are competing with foreign giant companies (e.g. 
Nortel, Cisco, and Lucent) in the Chinese market. The foreign vendors are attracted to 
China partly because of the lower engineering costs. The competition triggers a cutthroat 
price war, and the average price of telecommunications equipment is much lower than 
that of twenty years ago. Moreover, the successful R&D (product development), 
production, domestic sales and the protective government policies have positioned 
Chinese vendors financially to be ready to expand into the U.S. market.
2.4 Chinese Vendors’ Efforts to Export
The Chinese vendors are making a big push to expand their businesses outside the 
country. Initially, the Chinese vendors focus on easy-to-enter markets in developing 
countries, and then they focus on entering the U.S. market. In 2001, Huawei established 
its subsidiary Futurewei in the United States to respond to the customers’ requirements 
more quickly. Futurewei provides a wide range of advanced telecommunications products 
(including CDMA2000 IX & lxEV-DO Total Solutions, Metro Optical Networking,




Broadband Access, LAN Switches and Access Servers/VOIP Gateways) to serve carrier 
and enterprise customers. In 2003, Huawei doubled its overseas sales to US$1.05 billion. 
The commitment to overseas expansion can also be observed by Huawei's cooperation 
with 3Com. Huawei established a joint venture with 3Com to build a reputable brand 
name in the United States and, most importantly, to obtain 3Com’s sales channels in the 
U.S. ZTE also has the ambition to be a global player. It set up 13 wholly owned R&D 
centers worldwide and achieved high overseas sales. For example, it was chosen by the 
Greek Telecommunications Organization to supply the ADSL network covering sixteen 
points for the Athens 2004 Olympic Games.
These Chinese vendors have great competitive advantages compared to their 
American and European competitors due to lower engineering costs and manufacturing 
material costs. Engineers working for the Chinese vendors earn only one fifth to one 
tenth of the salaries of their counterparts in Silicon Valley. ZTE has 17,000 employees of 
whom 42% are in R&D, and 32% have Master’s degrees. Huawei has 22,000 employees 
of whom 46% are in R&D, and 85% have university degrees or higher degrees.
Christopher Rhoads and Charles Hutzler point out that Chinese equipment makers 
are expanding with their new weapon of competitive technology, in addition to their well- 
known low prices: “The Chinese incursion comes at a time when the incumbents are still 
smarting from the recent, three-year bust that has claimed hundreds of thousands of jobs 
in the West.”56 They use Nortel as an example, who has trimmed its work force down to 
35,000 from 95,000 since 2001 and plans to reduce a further 10% of its employees 
mostly because of its new Chinese competitors. With more manufacturing and R&D
56 Christopher Rhoads and Charles Hutzler, China’s Telecom Forays Squeeze Struggling Rivals, The wall 
street journal, September 8, 2004.
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outsourcings, Nortel commits to “become a more marketing-led company.”57 The
Chinese high quality and relative low cost telecommunications products attract customers
and threaten the giant incumbents in the global market.
The technology revolution also provides opportunities for the Chinese vendors.
Thanks to the biggest wireless domestic market in the world, the Chinese vendors are
developing state-of-the-art technologies under every standard. Huawei’s WCDMA end-
to-end solution is one of the most matured wireless technologies in the world, and is
currently deployed in many countries for mobile telecommunications. The Huawei and
ZTE WCDMA solutions performed excellent in the individual system test of the MTNet
organized by the Chinese Ministry of Information Industry.58 The Chinese vendors hope
to achieve success with their mobile products in the U.S. wireless market.
Also, the elastic demand for networking equipment in the U.S. market provides
an opportunity for the Chinese vendors. This price-oriented networking equipment
market benefits the Chinese vendors because the prices of their networking equipment are
much cheaper than the prices of comparable U.S vendors’ equipment. Pete Engardio
discusses “the China price” in Business Week:
“On Nov. 15, struggling 3Com Corp. (COMS ) in Marlborough, Mass., launched 
a data-communications switching system for corporate networks of 10,000 users 
or more. It claims twice the performance of Cisco Systems Inc.'s (CSCO ) 
comparable switch. At $183,000, 3Com's list price is 25% less. Its secret? 3Com 
is settling for lower margins and taking advantage of a 1,200-engineer joint 
venture with China telecom giant Huawei Technologies Co. This is the first high- 
end piece of networking gear sold by a U.S. company that is designed and 
manufactured in China.” 9
57 Nortel Launches Ad Campaign, Light Reading, November 8, 2004. 
(http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=62366&site=lightreading).
58 Building a Commercial WCDMA Network. 
(http://www.zte.com.en/Exhibition_Upload/3g2003/en/8.htm).
59 Pete Engardio, The China Price, Business Week November 30, 2004.
31
The Chinese vendors also have opportunities in the U.S. optical equipment 
market, since the U.S. optical networking market is growing rapidly. Meghan Fuller 
states: “Huawei has grown from a 1% global optical-networking market share in 1999 
and 2000 to an 8% share by mid-2003, when it was ranked fifth worldwide.”60 If the 
Chinese vendors take advantage of this business opportunity, then they can gain a 
foothold in the U.S. market and become co-players with the global networking giants.
However, Chinese telecommunications equipment vendors also have many 
problems in contrast with other giant transnational companies. The first problem is that 
the Chinese vendors are mainly good at low-end telecommunications equipment, though 
they claim that they can offer total solutions. Second, Chinese telecommunications 
equipment vendors are inexperienced in operation and management. After all, the 
Chinese economic environment is different from that of mainstream economic 
institutions. Cisco’s patent and copyright lawsuit with Huawei last year taught Chinese 
telecommunications equipment vendors a lesson about international competition rules. 
Cisco claimed that Huawei “violated at least five of the company's patents and copied 
Cisco's Internetwork Operating System source code”.61 Although Cisco later dropped the 
lawsuit, the infringement accusation damaged Huawei’s reputation and made the U.S. 
customers hesitant to choose the Chinese vendors as suppliers. The success of the 
Chinese vendors in the domestic market can by no means be copied in overseas markets.
The third problem is U.S. telecommunications technology standards, which are 
dominated by Cisco, Lucent and other big companies. The Chinese telecommunications
60 Meghan Fuller, Market Watch, Huawei emerges as a credible optical player, Lightwave Magazine, July 
2004.
6'Matt Hines, Cisco, Huawei suspend patent suit, CNET News.com, October 1, 2003. 
(http://news.com.com/Cisco,+Huawei+suspend+patent+suit/2100-1033_3-5084904.html).
32
equipment vendors complain that it is difficult to break into the U.S. market because of
different standards. At present, there are two interfaces to develop telecommunications
technologies in the world: E l, which is deployed in Europe, and T l, which is used mainly
in the United States and Japan. The Chinese telecommunications industry follows the El
standard to develop equipment and products, and it takes time and money for them to
develop double-standard products that satisfy the requirements of the U.S. industry.
Besides the standards, foreign industry regulations also block the Chinese
telecommunications equipment vendors’ expansion. They need approval from the relative
countries’ telecommunications authorities to export the telecommunications equipment.
For example, if they want to sell the equipment in the United States, they have to deal
with the FCC regulations; if the Chinese vendors try to export to the United Kingdom,
they have to be approved by the BABT (British Approvals Board for
Telecommunications).
The above analysis indicates the demands of the U.S. telecommunications
manufacturing market. With the knowledge of the market, the Chinese vendors should
make detailed strategies which include establishing joint ventures, R&D centers and sales
channels, choosing product portfolio, setting low prices and building brands to enter the
U.S. market. Paul Ross describes the Chinese telecommunications equipment vendors’
globalization in his article:
“Huawei's product portfolio is largely oriented toward GSM/W-CDMA and the 
company pursues a decidedly aggressive style in moving quickly to set up local 
offices and establish relationships with local vendors in target markets. ZTE, in 
contrast, has put its efforts into developing CDMA 2000 products and takes a 
more conservative approach to new markets, often watching and evaluating 
Huawei's experience before moving forward.”62
62 Paul Ross, Chinese Vendors Look for U.S. Fortunes, Wireless Week, January 15, 2004. 
(http://www.wirelessweek.com/article/CA374737?spacedesc=Features&stt=001).
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Indeed, Chinese telecommunications equipment vendors should develop state-of- 
the-art technologies and set appropriate product portfolios in terms of their core 
competences to suffice the demands of the U.S. market. For example, ZTE makes the 
following product portfolio for the U.S. telecommunications manufacturing market.
Figure 7: ZTE’s Product Portfolio63
In this portfolio, ZTE eliminates the old-model analog phones, and focuses on the 
Switch and access products, which are regarded as cash cows to generate revenues. Also, 
ZTE produces mobile telecommunications products, data communication products, 
optical switch and terminal products.
The distribution channels through which to enter the U.S. market consist of 
establishing subsidiary or sales offices, and cooperating with other U.S. 
telecommunications equipment companies. To attract customers in the United States, the
63 Company internal profile.
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Chinese telecommunications equipment vendors need to build a strong brand reputation, 
and to respond quickly to customers, and to provide complete after-sale maintenance 
services. Another effective method for Chinese telecommunications equipment vendors 
to gain access to the U.S. market is to attend telecommunications fairs and exhibitions. 
Chinese telecommunications equipment vendors are very active in promoting and 
participating in exhibitions. In 2001, Huawei designed a new Silk Road Plan 
(Shenzhen—Shanghai—Beijing). The important international exhibitions, which Huawei 
attended recently, included ITU Telecom World 2003, SVIAZ/EXPO COMM MOSCOW 
and Expocomm Mexico. Similarly, ZTE attended nine major overseas exhibitions in
2004.
Table 4: Exhibitions List of ZTE64
Number Time Exhibition
1 2004-08-09-08-11 ITCN ASIA 2004 (Karachi,PAKISTAN)
2 2004-08-04-08-08 ICT EXPO 2004 (Bangkok,Thailand)
3 2004-05-11-05-15 SVIAZ/EXPO COMM Moscow 2004
4 2004-05-04-05-08 ITU TELECOM Africa 2004 (Cairo, Egypt)
5 2004-03-18-03-20 Convergence INDIA 2004 (New Deli, India)
6 2004-03-02-03-05 Telexpo 2004 (Sao Paulo, Brazil)
7 2004-02-29-03-04 SAUDI COMMUNICATION 2004
8 2004-02-23-02-26 3GSM World Congress (Cannes, France)
9 2004-02-10-02-13 EXPO COMM MEXICO 2004
In short, the Chinese telecommunications equipment vendors have great
advantages and opportunities in exploring overseas markets if they overcome their 
weaknesses. Meanwhile, parts of the U.S. telecommunications equipment market offer 
many opportunities for the Chinese vendors. I have several suggested strategies for the 
Chinese vendors to develop the U.S. market: (1) investing more in R&D and marketing, 
taking advantage of the low engineering costs and setting low prices; (2) establishing
64 Exhibitions: (http://www.zte.com.cn/English/02news/show.jsp?typeYear=2004).
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joint ventures, R&D centers, and sales channels in the United States; (3) building more 
reliable brands to assure customers that they can offer complete-solution services; (4) 
learning more about the U.S. regulations and standards. Only with these strategies can 
Chinese telecommunications equipment vendors get a foot hold in the U.S. market. 
Further, the Chinese government needs to aid the Chinese vendors’ exploration in the 
U.S. market, which is discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3 International Economic Analysis
This chapter discusses government regulations which can help the international 
development of the Chinese telecommunications manufacturing industry. The first 
section examines the impact of China’s accession to the WTO on the international 
expansion of the telecommunications manufacturing industry, and the second section 
overviews the trade relationship between China and the United States. The third section 
reveals the role that the government can play in this industry’s development path. The 
following sections present analyses of tariffs, subsidies and other international trade 
policies.
3.1 China and the WTO
The world is increasingly interdependent through economic globalization. 
Economic globalization influences China greatly. In 1978, the Chinese government, led 
by President Deng Xiaoping, vowed to transform the centrally planned economy into a 
socialist market economy. During the last thirty years, the Chinese economy achieved 
impressive accomplishments by reforming and opening its economy. The average annual 
GDP growth rate during 1978 to 2002 was 9.3%65. According to 2003 Chinese customs 
statistics,66 Chinese exports ranked fourth in the world at US$ 438 billion, and Chinese 
imports ranked third in the world at US$ 413 billion, which accounted for 5.3% of the
65 Chinese Economy Overview: (http://www.in.ah.cn/analyses/zw2004/zw0402.HTM).
66 Chinese customs statistics: (http://www.customs.gov.en/tongjishujv/a/Pagel.htm).
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world imports. Figure 8 outlines the Chinese foreign trade growth. 
Figure 8: History of China Foreign Trade67
HISTORY OF CHINA FOREIGN TRADE
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. Also, China’s growing domestic market attracts investments around the world, 
and the foreign investment has been playing a key role in driving the Chinese economy.
In a news release on worldwide foreign direct investment, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) indicates: “China attracted $53 billion in 2003 
compared to $40 billion for the U.S. economy... and became the largest recipient of 
foreign direct investment (EDI) in 2003.”68 The BBC News also stated that a giant flow 
of EDI poured into China during 2004: “for the first half of 2004 as a whole, China's 
foreign direct investment was up 11.99% on last year to $33.9bn.”69 Despite the rampant 
SARS threat, the Chinese economy growth rate in 2003 achieved 9.1%. The secret of 
Chinese rising economy is simple: a stable society with a fairly complete infrastructure, 
cheap workers, and talented engineers.
67 Chinese customs statistics: (http://www.customs.gov.en/tongjishujv/a/PageLhtm).
68 China - largest recipient of foreign direct investment, World IT Report, June 29, 2004.
69 Investment still pours into China, BBC News, July 13, 2004.
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Given the size and robust growth of its economy, China attracts more and more
attention of the world. According to the IMF: “The expansion of China’s role in the world
trading system has been no less remarkable, with its overall share in world trade rising
from less than 1 percent in 1979 to about 6 percent in 2003.”70 China's enthusiastic
involvement in the world economic arena is convincing the world that China is an
integrated part of the world economy, and many people acknowledge that the Chinese
economy is a market economy.
Meanwhile, there are complaints that China is lagging behind in following WTO
regulations, especially in protecting intellectual property rights. China promises to deepen
its economic and political reform and eliminate trade barriers. Economic globalization
also will promote Chinese democracy. Only with the compliance to its WTO pledges can
the world's most populous nation provide immense opportunities for the domestic
telecommunications manufacturing industry.
The WTO’s impacts on Chinese telecommunications equipment vendors have two
aspects. On the one hand, these vendors can enjoy the tariff eliminations from many
countries, a benefit of WTO membership. According to the ITA (Information Technology
Agreement) tariff cutting mechanism of WTO:
“ITA provided for participants to completely eliminate duties on IT products 
covered by the Agreement by 1 January 2000. Developing country participants 
have been granted extended periods for some products.... While the Declaration 
provides for the review of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), there are no binding 
commitments concerning NTBs. There are three basic principles that one must 
abide by to become an ITA participant: 1) all products listed in the Declaration 
must be covered, 2) all must be reduced to a zero tariff level, and 3) all other 
duties and charges (ODCs) must be bound at zero. There are no exceptions to 
product coverage, however for sensitive items, it is possible to have an extended 
implementation period. The commitments undertaken under the ITA in the WTO
70 IMF Publications: China’s Growth and Integration into the World Economy: Prospects and Challenges. 
June 17, 2004.
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are on an MFN basis, and therefore benefits accrue to all other WTO Members.”71 
Under such ITA regulations, Chinese telecommunications equipment vendors gain
access to many countries in the world, and the Chinese vendors’ international expansions
are geared towards further Chinese economic development. On the other hand, joining in
the WTO means more market openness. More foreign companies are allowed to enter the
Chinese market gradually. Joining in the WTO benefits the most those Chinese labor-
intensive industries such as the textile industry. The developed countries have cultivated
their capital-intensive and technology-intensive industries for many years, and today their
firms have broader marketing networks and more renowned brands than those of
developing countries. When foreign firms enter the Chinese telecommunications
equipment market, they bring investment, technology transfers, and, most importantly,
competition. If the foreign vendors flood into the Chinese market without any
regulations, the Chinese telecommunications industry may be damaged. Song Hong says:
“WTO accession does not mean the weakening of the role of government in 
supporting enterprises and industries. What should however be changed is the 
ways and means; for example, studying protection measures which do not violate 
WTO regulations, the strategy of anti-dumping, the qualitative standard and 
system for every industry, and so on.”72
To be a WTO member is a major challenge for the Chinese government to spur 
the development of the telecommunications manufacturing industry. Obviously, the 
government must study the influences of WTO’s regulations on the telecommunications 
manufacturing industry carefully, and make unbiased policies to foster the development 
of the telecommunications manufacturing industry.
71 Information Technology Agreement: (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/inftec_e/inftec_e.htm).
72 Song Hong, The Impact of China’s WTO Accession on Industrial Development, Institute of World 
Economics and Politics, 2000, p7.
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3.2 Trade between the United States and China
The United States and China have witnessed the rapid growth of economic 
cooperation since 1979 when the two countries established diplomatic relations. Today 
the United States is one of China’s most important trade partners. People’s Daily Online 
shows that the United States is the second largest trade partner of China and “[t]he trade 
volume between China and the US hit a historic high of 126 billion US dollars in 
2003.”73
Meanwhile, the huge U.S. trade deficit with China generates many debates, and 
skeptics doubt the value of the close trade relationship between the United States and 
China. They claim that mass imports from China damages the U.S. labor market and 
causes a race to the bottom—a decline in real wages for the U.S. domestic laborers. 
Economists hold different opinions. For example, Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld 
find these adverse concerns unjustified. They argue that “[t]he effect of one country’s 
growth on another country’s real income depends on the bias of that growth; only if it 
biased toward the other country’s exports will it reduce its real income via worsened 
terms of trade.”74 By comparing the average annual trade percentage changes between 
advanced countries and developing countries, they find that the negative influence of the 
cheaper labor costs of developing countries is too small to affect the developed countries’ 
economies.
In reality, China has a comparative advantage with the United States mainly in 
low-end markets. Close Sino-U.S. economic cooperation is mutually beneficial to both 
countries, and the trade between these two countries is complementary to each country’s
73 Sino-US trade volume tops US$100 billion in 2003, People’s Dairy Online, February 09, 2004.
74 Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International economics, sixth edition, 2002, pl03.
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economy. Economists claim that the economic rise of China helps the U.S. economy.
U.S. consumers save billions of dollars by importing cheaper manufactured goods from 
China. Clay, Joan and Zhang agree with “the more of a boon than a bane” point of view 
and state that:
“[imports from China] has helped Alan Greenspan keep interest rates lower for 
longer, making it easier for America's consumers to buy houses and for its 
companies to invest. And the charge that China is mercantilistic, focused solely 
on exports, just doesn't wash. Yes, China ran a $59 billion trade surplus with the 
U.S. last year. But for the most part, its U.S. trade gains came at the expense of 
rival exporters.”75
The Chinese government continues to express its intent to cooperate with the
United States. The People’s Daily Online lists Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s five
principles of economic partnership between China and the United States which were
proposed at a meeting with American scholars in New York on December 8, 2003:
“First, mutual benefit and win-win result. Thinking broadly, one should take 
account of the other's interests while pursuing its own. Second, development first. 
Existing differences should be resolved through expanded trade and economic 
cooperation. Third, greater scope to coordinating mechanisms in bilateral trade 
and economic relations. Disputes should be addressed in a timely manner through 
communication and consultation to avoid possible escalation. Fourth, equal 
consultation. The two sides should seek consensus while reserving differences on 
major issues, instead of imposing restrictions or sanctions at every turn. Fifth, do 
not politicize economic and trade issues.”76
Correspondingly, the U.S. government shows confidence in the economic 
collaboration with China. For example, the U.S. Department of Commerce secretary, 
Donald Evans expressed the U.S. government’s optimistic attitude toward the economic 
cooperation with China in the third China-U.S. Telecommunications Summit which was 
held on June 17, 2004. Donald Evans stated:
“We look forward to building on the success of these previous Summits and
75 Chandler, Clay, Levinstein, Joan, Dahong, Zhang, Inside the New China, Fortune (Europe), 10/4/2004, 
Vol. 150, Issue 6.
76 Wen proposes principles on Sino-US trade economic ties, People’s Dairy Online, December 2003
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further strengthening the economic relationship between our two countries... In 
China, as in the United States, entrepreneurs and innovators recognize the 
enormous potential within the telecom sector. That is one of the significant 
reasons why we are the two fastest growing economies in the world... As I survey 
the IT landscape, I see an amazing opportunity for the Chinese and American 
people.”77
Donald Evans’s speech encouraged communication and international trade between these 
two countries. He argued that both the United States and China can win if they avoid 
unnecessary conflicts and promote fair trade.
3.3 Role of the Government
The current global trade environment and the progressively closer trade 
relationship between the United States and China provide opportunities for the Chinese 
vendors to further expand into U.S. markets. In turn, the Chinese economy can develop 
further if the Chinese vendors succeed in their international expansion. The international 
growth of the Chinese telecommunications manufacturing industry is a major objective of 
the Chinese government. Statistic of the Ministry of Information Industry, which is the 
regulatory agency of the Chinese telecommunications manufacturing industry, shows that 
the 2003 taxes collected from the telecommunications industry are RMB 17.72 billion 
(more than US$2 billion), dwarfing other products. The 2003 taxes collected from 
Huawei is RMB2.8 billion (US$338 million), and the 2003 taxes collected from ZTE is 
RMB2.2 billion (US$266 million).78 The importance of the telecommunications 
manufacturing industry to government revenue implies that the government must play an 
active role and make strategic policies to support the development of the industry.
77 Donald Evans, Remarks in the China-U.S. Telecommunications Summit, 2004. 
(http://www.commerce.gov/opa/speeches/Evans/2004/June_17_Evans_CATS2004.htm).
78 Statistics of Ministry of Information Industry, 2003. 
(http://www.mii.gov.cn/mii/hyzw/tongji/2004-040501.htm)
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Observations of strongly performing Asian economies show the payoffs of 
government interventionism. Far from free trade, some successful eastern Asian 
countries, such as Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan (region), followed complex 
policies including tariff, quotas, export subsidies, national bank loans, import restrictions, 
and most importantly, R&D subsidies in their high-technology information industries.
The Singapore government has directed the economy in all sectors. South Korea has 
sponsored telecommunication equipment vendors to grow as giant transnational 
companies. For example, Samsung, a Korean company, becomes a famous 
telecommunication equipment vendor in the U.S. market with the Korean government 
support.
Many developed countries have a range of favorable policies which support their 
high-technology telecommunications manufacturing industry. The Japanese government 
took a proactive role in developing high-technologies industries and embarked on many 
strategies of promoting digitization. In March 2001, the Japanese government launched 
an “E-Japan Priority Policy Program” to realize its goals of ensuring security of its 
telecommunications infrastructures, to develop its advanced information and 
telecommunications industries, and to become a leading IT nation.79 The U.S. 
government also provides R&D subsidies to its telecommunications industry. For 
example, Sumit Majumdar states: “Whether the criticism of cross-subsidization is fair or 
not, in an allocative efficiency sense, it remains a key institutional mechanism in the U.S. 
telecommunications industry.”80 Langdale also points out: “ ...their international
79 e-Japan Priority Policy Program 2001, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabnet, 
(http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/it_e.html).
80 Sumit Majumdar, With a Little Help from My Friends? Cross-Subsidy and Installed-Base Quality in the 
U.S. Telecommunications Industry, International Journal of Industrial Organization, April 2000, v. 18, iss.
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expansion is strongly supported by their respective governments. U.S. companies 
dominate a number of areas in broadband telecommunications and multimedia 
technologies and are likely to win major export markets.”81
In a less developed country, it is also necessary for the government to promote the 
development of its high-technology industries. Import-substituting industrialization 
encourages the development of these industries. By using tariffs, subsidies and other 
trade policies, a less developed country’s government can buttress its domestic industries 
and replace imported manufacturing commodities with domestic commodities, and 
become more industrialized. Krugman and Obstfeld state: “As a strategy for encouraging 
growth of manufacturing, import-substituting industrialization has clearly worked.”82 The 
Chinese government has applied this strategy in its telecommunications manufacturing 
industry and encouraged carriers to replace imported telecommunications equipment with 
domestic products.
This import-substituting policy is consistent with Vernon’s product life cycle 
theory. Applying Vernon’s dynamic product life cycle model to the Chinese 
telecommunications manufacturing industry, four stages are shown in figure 9.
3, pp. 445-70.
81 John Langdale, International Competitiveness in East Asia, Telecommunications Policy, April 1997, 
?2239'Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International economics, sixth edition, 2002, p259.
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Figure 9: Product Life Cycle83
PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE
STAGE I STAGE II STAGE III STAGE IV
There is a product life cycle after an innovative telecommunication product X is 
invented. The U.S. vendors’ production and Chinese vendors’ production of X are shown 
in this figure. In stage one, the U.S. vendors begin mass production of X and export to 
China. In Stage two, the Chinese vendors start producing imitations of X, and the output 
of the U.S. vendors begins to decline. In Stage three, imported X diminishes from the 
Chinese market. In stage four, the Chinese vendors begin to export X to the U.S. market.
The Chinese vendors have passed the imitation stage, and now are competitive in 
both the domestic and overseas markets. They are increasing Chinese domestic market 
shares, especially in the low-end equipment markets. Finally, as the chart shows, the 
Chinese producers may enter the U.S. market. The indigenous Chinese 
telecommunications equipment vendors have an important competitive edge with their
83 Dr. Tran Dung, Product Life Cycle, (http://www.wright.edu/~tdung/product_cycle.htm).
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great comparative advantages, and can provide customers with more cost-effective 
solutions in the low end telecommunications market. The 2002 total local production of 
Chinese telecommunications equipment industry was US$19 billion.84 The above product 
life cycle analysis depicts the development trend of the Chinese telecommunications 
manufacturing industry, and hints at policies implications for the Chinese government, 
such as subsidies and local content requirements.
Nevertheless, there are some problems in the Chinese government’s current 
policies for the telecommunications manufacturing industry. As the Chinese economy 
relies heavily on foreign investment, the government encourages foreign investment in 
China by promising an open market and favorable policies. Sometimes the Chinese 
government makes the competition unfair to the domestic firms. For example, the 
Telecommunications Reports states that Chinese carriers signed contracts worth US$2.3 
billion with U.S. telecommunication equipment vendors in order to balance the trade
o r
surplus in January 2004. The director of the China Academy of Telecommunications 
Research under the Ministry of Information Industry, Chen Jinqiao, cautioned the above 
US$2.3 billion purchasing: “The large amount of purchases may also have some negative 
impact on the research and development of domestic enterprises.”86
In all, the Chinese government must pay more attention to the strategic policies so 
that it can facilitate the development of domestic telecommunications equipment vendors 
in international trade. The possible policies include tariffs, quotas, export subsidies, 
import restrictions and low-interest loans. I assess the strategic policies and regulations
84 Jianhong Wang, Telecommunications Equipment Market in China, STAT-USA. 
(http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/intemet/inimr-ri.nsfyen/grl22582e.html).
85 U.S. Equipment Firms Snag $2.3B in China Contracts, Telecommunications Reports; January 1, 2004, 
Vol. 70 Issue 2, p37.
86 Tech deals benefit US, China, China Daily, 1/14/2004, (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2004- 
01/14/content_298943.htm).
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one by one in the following sections.
3.4 Analysis of Tariff
China enjoyed a rapid economic growth rate and a relatively stable government 
for the last three decades. Economists study the impact of government regulations, 
principally tariffs, on the overseas development of the telecommunications manufacturing 
industry. A specific tariff imposed by a large country can raise the price at home and 
lower the price in a foreign country. To assess the tariff policy, the point is to evaluate the 
benefit and cost of a tariff. Krugman and Obstfeld state the cost and benefit of a tariff in a 
large country:
“A tariff raises the price of a good in the importing country and lowers it in the 
exporting country. As a result of these price changes, consumers lose in the 
importing country and gain in the exporting country. Producers gain in the 
importing country and lose in the exporting country... To compare these costs and 
benefits, it’s necessary to quantify them.”8
According to the above industry analysis, I assume that both the United States and 
China are relatively large countries, and China is considering the tariff policy for a 
telecommunications product. Figure 10 sketches the cost and benefit effects of a tariff in 
China.
Figure 10: Cost and Benefits of a Tariff in a Large Country
87 Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International economics, sixth edition, 2002, pl92.
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Costs and Benefits of a Tariff of Large Country
*  S domestic
0 rv Qualify
Before the tariff, the world price of this telecommunications product is Pw, and
China’s import of this product is the difference of the world supply and domestic supply:
S 'D 1. The world supply curve changes to Sw+tariff if the country imposes a tariff on a
telecommunications product. After the tariff, the import of this product is reduced to
S2d 2 Thg Chinese government receives the tariff revenue of BCFG which is comprised
of two parts: the revenue from the domestic consumers: BCEH, and the revenue from
foreign producers: HEFG. The domestic producer’s surplus changes from IDPw to
JCPw+t. The consumer surplus is decreased, and the net consumer welfare is negative
CDPw+tPw, which is the consumer’s efficiency loss. In this case, the country’s net
welfare depends on the difference of the government revenue, producer’s surplus change,
and the consumer’s efficiency loss (also called deadweight loss). If the result of the
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government revenue, producer’s surplus change, and the consumer’s efficiency loss is 
positive, then the country has a net gain, otherwise, the country has a net loss.
Since bilateral trade between the United States and China is large, tariffs cause 
big consumer’s efficiency losses both to China and the United States. A tariff can benefit 
domestic manufacturers, however it may hurt the economy in the long run since 
international trade is not a zero sum game. Therefore, a tariff is not suggested as a good 
policy. The WTO requires its members to reduce tariffs, and the United States and China 
have reached an agreement on tariffs. Table 5 details the changes of Chinese tariffs on 
imported industrial products and electronics.
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88 The China Business Review, The US-CHINA business council.
(http://www.uschina.org/public/wto/uscbc/wtobilat.html).
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3.5 Analysis of Subsidies
Non-tariff protection policies include quotas, export subsidies, and the priority use 
of domestic products and standard. This sector discusses the policy of subsidies to the 
Chinese vendors. Game theory is introduced in this section to analyze the impact of 
subsidies on the firms’ rational behaviors. Specifically, I use the international Duopoly 
model to analyze the proposed subsidies. In this model, firms make strategies to compete, 
and finally achieve a Nash equilibrium: no player can benefit from changing their 
strategy while holding the other player’s strategy constant. Assume that the current giant 
U.S. vendors to be a group, and the Chinese vendors to be another group. Since the U.S. 
and Chinese telecommunications manufacturing industries consist of a small number of 
large competitors, international competition between the Chinese group and the U.S. 
group is imperfect. The possibilities of the two groups’ rational behaviors under the free 
competition are shown in the following Table 6:
Table 6: Behaviors Possibilities I
COMPETITION The U.S. Vendors
Produce The U.S. Vendors: -$10 The U.S. Vendors: $0
Chinese
Vendors
Chinese Vendors: -$10 Chinese Vendors: $200
Don't The U.S. Vendors: $ 200 The U.S. Vendors: $0 
Produce
Chinese Vendors: $0 Chinese Vendors: $0
In this situation, assume the U.S. vendors are first-movers (the U.S. vendors are 
usually first-movers in the telecommunications manufacturing industry historically), and
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they plan to produce and make $200 profit. The Chinese vendors choose not to produce 
when they see that there is no margin profit left in the U.S. market.
However, if the Chinese vendors receive a $50 subsidy from the Chinese 
government to produce, they will produce and make profits, whether the U.S. vendors 
produce or not. This induces the U.S. vendors not to produce unless they get a subsidy 
too. If both the Chinese vendors and the U.S. vendors produce, supply will outstrip 
demand, then the price and profit will fall. The Chinese vendors still get $40 profits via 
government subsidy, whereas the U.S. vendors lose $10. Seeing this, the U.S. vendors 
choose not to produce. Refer to Table 7.
Table 7: Behaviors Possibilities II




The U.S. Vendors 1
Chinese
Vendors
The U.S. Vendors: $-10 
Chinese Vendors: $40
The U.S. Vendors: $0
Chinese Vendors: $250
The U.S. Vendors: $ 200 
Chinese Vendors: $0
The U.S. Vendors: $0 
Chinese Vendors: $0
This result yielded by the model is consistent with the conclusion of Brander and 
Spencer. The Chinese vendors can succeed in international competition with government 
help. The Chinese government can choose export subsidies as a development strategy, 
and moreover, the government also can use R&D subsidies or other investment subsidies 
to accelerate the international development of the telecommunications manufacturing
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industry even when the export subsidies are constricted by international rules.
The R&D subsidies are better than direct export subsidies because the R&D 
subsidies facilitate the development of innovative technologies instead of firms. The 
telecommunications manufacturing industry is different from other industries because it 
is a high-technology industry which deploys the most advanced technologies.
Information technology is usually linked with economic growth, particularly in China, a 
less-developed country. Francisco Rodriguez and Ernest Wilson examine the information 
and communication technology (ICT) gap between rich and poor countries and find the 
relationship between ICT and the national economy: “these new innovations have the 
potential for transforming societies internally, and transforming their relationships to the 
global economy.”89 They suggest the expansion of ICT will bring positive possibilities for 
development in less developed countries. Since the telecommunications manufacturing 
industry is applying the advanced ICT and the telecommunications vendors are very 
important in developing the ICT further, R&D subsidies to the telecommunications vendors 
are necessary. Likewise, Krugman and Obstfeld suggest R&D subsidies instead of the 
general subsidy for the government to foster the high-technology industry: “A general 
subsidy for a set of industries in which this kind of knowledge generation is believed to 
go on is pretty blunt instrument for the purpose.”90
Therefore, R&D subsidies for the telecommunications manufacturing industry, 
which applies and develops information and communication technologies, are more helpful 
than direct export subsidies. The official research institutes, for example, Chinese 
Telecommunications Science & Technology Research Institute, sponsor
89 Francisco Rodriguez and Ernest Wilson, Are Poor Countries Losing the Information Revolution, May 
2002, The world bank inforDev working paper, (http://www.infodev.org/library/working.htm).
90 Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International economics, sixth edition, 2002, p278
54
telecommunications manufacturing firms by providing R&D resources. Many Chinese 
firms benefit from rapidly upgrading technology. With higher R&D capability, the 
Chinese vendors gain more competences in the U.S. market.
3.6 Analysis of Other Trade Policies
In addition to the subsidies policy, the Chinese government can make other 
policies to support the Chinese telecommunications manufacturing industry development. 
For example, the government can have local content requirements to limit the import of 
telecommunications equipment. This policy requires that at least a certain percentage of 
equipment be produced domestically, and stimulates international vendors to establish 
joint ventures or manufacturing plants in China to be localized.
The most famous joint venture in the Chinese telecommunications manufacturing 
industry is Alcatel Shanghai Bell, the first telecommunications joint venture with 
majority foreign ownership. Lucent has two labs in Beijing and Shanghai and three other 
joint Chinese ventures. It opened another R&D center in Nanjing in 2004. Motorola, one 
of the largest foreign investors in China, invests more than US$3.4 billion and has eight 
joint Chinese ventures.91 After dropping the lawsuit against Huawei, Cisco views China 
as a major technology center, and it plans to invest US$32 million in its new Shanghai 
research center in the next five years. Cisco’s CEO John Chambers say: “We believe in
92giving something back and truly becoming a Chinese company.” The Chinese 
government assists the Chinese telecommunications manufacturing industry by absorbing 
capital investments and by transferring technology from these joint ventures to domestic
91 Company profile, (http://www.motorola.com.cn/about/inchina/).




Alternatively, the Buy Chinese Acts requires the Chinese state-owned carriers to
buy Chinese telecommunications equipment. Some local Chinese governments ask the
carriers to purchase domestic telecommunications equipment unless comparable foreign
equipment is much cheaper. There are U.S. firms claiming that the “buy local” policies
increase costs for the Chinese telecommunications carriers. For example, the American
Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of China (AmCham-China), which
represents the U.S. companies and individuals doing business in China, says that:
“AmCham-China believes it would benefit Chinese industry to purchase 
telecommunications equipment on the basis of functionality and cost 
requirements for any given project, rather than favoring domestic enterprises. Buy 
local policies that treat joint ventures as completely foreign vendors serve only to 
discourage further foreign capital or technology investment in the country.”93
The Chinese government has a different perspective on these policies. By 
fostering the growth of the Chinese vendors, the Chinese government has helped the 
Chinese telecommunications manufacturing industry to pass its infancy. Today, the 
Chinese vendors compete with the U.S. vendors and resulting in dramatic 
telecommunications equipment prices decreases for the Chinese carriers.
To support the future development of the telecommunications manufacturing 
industry, the Chinese government also sponsors new telecommunications technology 
R&D, such as the TD-SCDMA standard, which is a substitute for the 3G WCDMA and 
CDMA2000 standards. The Ministry of Information Industry (Mil) is keen to issue 3G 
licenses “because the government wants to use its market clout to influence the 
development of 3G worldwide.”94The purpose of the Chinese government’s sponsorship
93 Telecommunications, 2000 White Paper, The American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic 
of China, (http://www.amcham-china.org.cn/publications/white/2000/en-17.htm).
94 Bruce Einhorn, Why Beijing Has 3G on Hold, Business Week, November 23, 2004.
56
of the TD-SCDMA standard is to achieve independent technology to negotiate with 
foreign vendors and facilitate the domestic telecommunications equipment vendors.
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Chapter 4 Conclusion
Viewed as an economic engine, the telecommunications manufacturing industry is 
very important to China’s national economy. By analyzing the U.S. telecommunications 
manufacturing market and the growing Chinese telecommunications manufacturing 
industry, I find that the Chinese telecommunications equipment vendors have 
comparative advantages from lower costs (mainly engineering costs) and some 
technologies in competing with the current U.S. incumbents. Chinese vendors have 
developed enough to enter the U.S. market. Possible strategies for the Chinese vendors to 
enter the U.S. market are suggested: investing more in R&D, setting low prices with 
appropriate portfolios, establishing joint ventures and R&D centers, building reliable 
brands, and learn more about the U.S. regulations.
In the meantime, this paper suggests that government should play an active role in 
the Chinese telecommunications manufacturing industry’s international development for 
the sake of China’s future prosperity. After analyzing different government protective 
regulations, tariffs are not recommended. Instead, I suggest the Chinese government use 
R&D subsidies, local contents requirements, and Buy Chinese Acts. Supported by the 
Chinese government, the telecommunications manufacturing industry promises to 
achieve its international development.
58
Bibliography
Brander and Spencer, International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy, Reviews of 
Economic Studies, 1983, p7Q8.
Bruce Einhom, Why Beijing Has 3G on Hold, Business Week, November 23, 2004.
Chandler, Clay, Levinstein, Joan, Dahong, Zhang, Inside the New China, Fortune 
(Europe), 10/4/2004, Vol. 150, Issue 6.
Christopher Rhoads and Charles Hutzler, China’s Telecom Forays Squeeze Struggling 
Rivals, The wall street journal, September 8, 2004.
Donald Evans, Remarks in the China-U.S. Telecommunications Summit, 2004.
(http://www.commerce.gov/opa/speeches/Evans/2004/June_17_Evans_CATS200
4.htm).
Dr. Tran Dung, Product Life Cycle, http://www.wright.edu/~tdung/product_cycle.htm.
Eileen M. Bossong-Martines, Industry Surveys, 2004, Standard & Poor’s, 
Communications Equipment.
Francisco Rodriguez and Ernest Wilson, Are Poor Countries Losing the Information 
Revolution, May 2002, The world bank inforDev working paper, 
(http://www.infodev.org/library/working.htm).
Jianhong Wang, Telecommunications Equipment Market in China, STAT-USA. 
(http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/intemet/inimr-ri.nsf/en/grl22582e.html).
John Langdale, International Competitiveness in East Asia, Telecommunications Policy, 
April 1997, p239.
Liang Xiongjian and Zhang Jing, Development and Regulatory System Reform of the 
Telecommunications Industry in China, Global Communications Newsletter. 
(http://www.comsoc.org/pubs/gcn/gcnll03.html).
Matt Hines, Cisco, Huawei suspend patent suit, CNET News.com, October 1, 2003. 
(http://news.com.com/Cisco,+Huawei+suspend+patent+suit/2100-1033_3- 
5084904.html).
Meghan Fuller, Market Watch, Huawei emerges as a credible optical player, Lightwave 
Magazine, July 2004.
Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International economics, sixth edition, 2002.
Paul Ross, Chinese Vendors Look for U.S. Fortunes, Wireless Week, January 15, 2004.
(http://www.wirelessweek.com/article/CA374737?spacedesc=Features&stt=001). 
Paul Travis, Cisco Profits Up 29%, Information Week, Nov. 9, 2004.
(http://informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml7articleIEt52600310).
Pete Engardio, The China Price, Business Week November 30, 2004.
Qingxuan Meng and Mingzhi Li, New economy and ICT development in China, 
Information Economics and Policy Volume: 14, Issue: 2, June, 2002.
Raymond Vernon, International investment and international trade in the product cycle, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics; May 1966, Vol. 80.
Rebecca Marlow-Ferguson, Encyclopedia of American Industries, 2001, Gale Group, 
pl057.
Robert Carbaugh, International Economics, 2001, p28.
Robert Lazich, Market Share Reporter, 2004, Gale Group, p246.
Rowan Callick, China's Labor Shortage, Tech Center Station, August 31, 2004.
Sharon Grace, Spending on Enterprise Voice and Data Equipment Expected to Increase to 
$122 Billion in 2007, IA Online, April 7, 2004.
(http://www.tiaonline.org/medi a/press_releases/index.cfm?parelease=04-39)
Song Hong, The Impact of China’s WTO Accession on Industrial Development, Institute 
of World Economics and Politics, 2000, p7.
Sumit Majumdar, With a Little Help from My Friends? Cross-Subsidy and Installed-Base 
Quality in the U.S. Telecommunications Industry, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, April 2000, v. 18, iss. 3, pp. 445-70.
Susan McMaster, Telecommunications: competition and network access, Industry 
Studies, 3rd ed, 2002, p379 
863 high technology research and development plan is launched to develop the Chinese 
economy through high technology.
(http://www.chinatech.com.en/techachieve/intro/plan863.htm#aaa).
Agricultural Tax to Be Phased Out, China Daily September 11, 2004.
60
(http://www.china.org.cn/english/BAT/106768.htm).
Building a Commercial WCDMA Network.
(http://www.zte.com.en/Exhibition_Upload/3g2003/en/8.htm).
China Economics Network, Telecom Services Development Data. 
(http://down.cenet.org.cn/list.asp?id=5).
China - largest recipient of foreign direct investment, World IT Report, June 29, 2004.
China's TD-SCDMA to be Operational by Mid-2005, ITU Strategy and Policy Unit 
Newslog. (http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/newslog/2004/02/25.html).
Chinese customs’ statistics. (http://www.customs.gov.en/tongjishujv/a/Pagel.htm).
Chinese Economy Overview: (http://www.in.ah.cn/analyses/zw2004/zw0402.HTM) .
Cisco sees China as center of tech, CNN Money, September 23, 2004. 
(http://money.cnn.com/2004/09/23/news/intemational/cisco_china.reut/).
Communications Equipment in the United States, Communications Equipment Industry 
Profile: United States. 2003, DATAMONITOR.
Communications Equipment in China, Communications Equipment Industry Profile: 
China 2003, DATAMONITOR.
Company profile (http://www.ericsson.com/about/).

















Definition of two-part tariff. (http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Two_part_tariff).
Exhibitions: (http://www.zte.com.cn/English/02news/show.jsp7typeYear=2004).
IMF Publications: China’s Growth and Integration into the World Economy: Prospects 
and Challenges. June 17, 2004.
Information Technology Agreement:
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/inftec_e/inftec_e.htm).
Investment still pours into China, BBC News, July 13, 2004.
Iridium, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iridium_(satellite).
Huawei Global Sales Reached US$3.83 Billion in 2003.
(http://www.huawei.com/about/News-Events/News-Center/930.shtml).
ITU selects ZTE to draft next-gen standards, China Information Industry, June 28, 2004.
Net profit of the telecommunications manufacturing industry ranks first in the electronic 
and information industry.
(http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/southnews/tszk/nfdsb/smzk/200406020473.asp)
Nortel Launches Ad Campaign, Light Reading, November 8, 2004.
(http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=62366&site=ligh treading).
Sino-US trade volume tops US$100 billion in 2003, People’s Dairy Online, February 09, 
2004.
Statistics of Ministry of Information Industry, June 2004.
Telecommunications, 2000 White Paper, The American Chamber of Commerce in the 
People's Republic of China, (http://www.amcham- 
china.org.cn/publications/white/2000/en-17.htm).
The 2000-2005 world outlook for telecommunications equipment, San Diego, Calif. : 
Icon Group Ltd., C2002. (http://www.netlibrary.com/EbookDetails.aspx).
The China Business Review, The US-CHINA business council. 
(http://www.uschina.org/public/wto/uscbc/wtobilat.html).
Trends in Communications-An Environment Overview.
(http://www.ewh.ieee.org/r7/southem_alberta/html/events/trends_in_communications.pps).
Peasant worker has become major force of China's working class, China Daily, July 09,
62
2 0 0 4 . (http://english.people.com.cn/200407/09/eng20040709_149051.html).
Statistics of Ministry of Information Industry, 2003.
(http://www. mii. gov.cn/mii/hyzw/tongj i/2004-040501 .htm).
e-Japan Priority Policy Program 2001, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabnet, 
(http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/it_e.html).
Tech deals benefit US, China, China Daily, 1/14/2004,
(http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2004-01/14/content_298943.htm).
U.S. Equipment Firms Snag $2.3B in China Contracts, Telecommunications Reports; 
January 1, 2004, Vol. 70 Issue 2, p37.
Wen proposes principles on Sino-US trade economic ties, People’s Dairy Online, 
December 2003.
63
